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I. INTRODUCTION
Towards the end of a long and successful career in business, a wealthy
individual built an expensive yacht, which he planned to use to sail around
the world.1 Before he could sail the yacht, he had to take one crucial step:
obtain insurance. He went to a brokerage firm, who he hired to find an
insurance plan for the vessel.2 The brokerage firm found a plan, and the
owner went on his dream sailing trip. He embarked off the Eastern Seaboard,
headed south and west through the Panama Canal, before eventually making
his way up towards the Californian coast.3 Within a nautical mile of the dock
in Southern California, the yacht scraped a bed of rocks underwater,
damaging the vessel’s underside.4 The businessman knew that his insurance
would not cover the full price of the yacht, but assumed that his plan would
cover the full amount of any damages.5 Without consulting his broker or the
insurer, he had the yacht revamped by a repair shop right near the dock.6
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law.
1 Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Bear LLC, No. 15cv630 BTM (BLM),
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58247, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2016).
2 Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Bear, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1054
(S.D. Cal. 2017).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58247, at *3.
6 Id.
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Contrary to the owner’s beliefs, the yacht’s damage was slightly more
severe than he originally thought, since the steel frame of the yacht was also
damaged and would cost hundreds of thousands of dollars to fully repair.7
The repair shop informed the owner that welding was required to fix the
damage to the steel frame.8 During the welding process, the entire yacht
caught fire and destroyed it beyond repair.9 Horrified, the owner sought
consolation and contacted his insurance company, only to learn that his
unintentional violation of the insurance agreement prevented a payout of his
policy.10 Under the terms of his agreement, the businessman owner was
required to notify the insurance company prior to any repairs payable by the
policy, which he failed to do when he sought to repair the yacht’s frame.11 In
an attempt to recoup his losses, the man turned to the court for justice, but
summary judgment was granted for the insurer, since the businessman had
clearly violated the policy’s notification requirement.12 Unable to recoup his
losses from the insurance company, the businessman took action against the
insurance brokerage who procured the policy on his behalf.13
In his case against the insurance broker, the complainant-businessman
argued for, among other things, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
and negligence.14 Although the court granted the broker’s motions for
summary judgment on the businessman’s claims for breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty and negligence claims, the court allowed his claims
for heightened fiduciary and common law claims to continue.15 The
heightened duties claim is a factual determination which requires it proceed
to trial for a jury to decide.16
This note will analyze the heightened duties of insurance brokers and
when those heightened standards apply. Part I will address the role of
insurance brokers and distinguish their relationship with the insurer from the
insured clients. Part II will set out the nationally-recognized common law
duties of brokers and provide brief examples of conduct that breaches those
obligations. Part III will analyze the heightened duty standards in Florida,
New York, and California to establish what circumstances have led courts to
hold brokers to a heightened standard. Part IV will compare the Florida, New
7

Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 1054.
Id. at 1055.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 1054.
12 Id. at 1063.
13 See generally Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 1054.
14 See generally Bear, LLC v. Marsh USA, Inc., No. 15-cv-00630-BTM-BLM, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 68115, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2018).
15 Id. at 29.
16 Id.
8
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York, and California’s standards, discussing the policy considerations that
each state evaluates when examining the standard. Part IV will then propose
a standard for when heightened duties should be imposed, suggesting that
states adopt a standard similar to the heightened duties enforced in
California.
II. BACKGROUND
Insurance brokers play an important role in the insurance industry.
Brokers function as intermediaries, connecting commercial and wealthy
individual clients with insurance companies.17 Insurance brokers are not
insurance agents. Insurance agents are paid employees of the insurer,
whereas brokers are not employees of either the insurer or insured.18 This
note will focus on the role and duties of insurance brokers.
Insurance brokers are often regarded as agents of the insured party in
an agency context, but this is not always the case.19 The agency relationship
stems from the insured client-principal requests for the broker-agent to find
specific insurance coverage, which the broker-agent obtains on the client’s
behalf.20 This principal-agent relationship is automatically created when the
insured client requests the services of the broker.21 Unlike typical principalagent relationships, insurance brokers can have a “dual-agency” role.22 In
this role, insurance brokers can be agents for both the insured client as well
as the insurer-client.23 Under normal circumstances, this would create a
conflict of interest. However, in the insurance broker context, the insured
and insurer-clients’ respective interests are not in conflict.24
Principal-agent relationships provide the principal with a level of
control over the agent in certain matters.25 When insurance brokers are
agents of the insured, the latter “controls the broker in placing coverage with
insurer.”26 On the other hand, when insurance brokers are agents of an
17

Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability, 40 TORT & INS. L.J. 1,
6–7 (2004).
18 ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 254 (3d ed. 2002).
19 See DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 126 (1995) (stating that absent contrary agreement, “an agent may not act for
anyone whose interests might conflict with the interests of the principal,” and describing this
as a “duty of undivided loyalty”); HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW
OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 127 (2d ed. 1990) (“It is the duty of an agent to act solely and
completely for the benefit of his principal.”).
20 Jerry, II, supra note 18.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).
26 Richmond, supra note 17, at 6–7 (citing Jerry, II, supra note 18).
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insurer, the insurer controls the broker “in collecting premiums.”27 These two
aspects of an agent’s duties do not conflict.28 It is important to note that the
insured client can expressly or impliedly permit the broker to be a dual-agent
for the insurer. but only with express, contractual agreement from the
insurer.29 The insurer-client’s relationship to the broker is not automatically
a principal-agent relationship.30 This is because the insured party should
know that the broker is responsible for collecting premiums, since it pays its
premiums to the broker rather than directly to the insurer.31 However, the
insurer should know the extent of the broker’s relationship with secured
clients and the possibility that the broker will be representing the insuredclient’s interests beyond simply procuring coverage before authorizing a
dual-agency.32
In the Polar Bear case, the owner of the yacht had the boat appraised
by marine surveyors independent of the broker.33 Subsequently, the owner
hired the insurance brokerage firm to obtain insurance coverage.34 Hiring the
brokerage firm formed the principal-agent relationship between the two
parties, and the insurance broker sought out coverage from various insurers
and presented its findings to the principal.35 In this case, though irrelevant,
none of the parties engaged in dual-agency. The broker, now the agent for
the insured client-principal, had duties and responsibilities that he owed to
the client under the agency relationship between the two parties.
III. AN INSURANCE BROKER’S COMMON LAW DUTIES
Insurance brokers owe common law duties to the insured client through
the contractual and agency relationships between the two parties.36 There are
generally four claims that an insured client can bring against an insurance
broker in violation of these duties: (1) negligence (in tort), (2) breach of
contract, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, and (4) breach of heightened duties.37
This section will cover the first three claims, and how insured clients bring
27

Id.
Id.
29 See Kleinberger, supra note 19 (stating that absent contrary agreement, “an agent may
not act for anyone whose interests might conflict with the interests of the principal,” and
describing this as a “duty of undivided loyalty”); Reuschlein & Gregory, supra note 19 (“It
is the duty of an agent to act solely and completely for the benefit of his principal.”).
30 See Kleinberger, supra note 19.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Bear, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1054
(S.D. Cal. 2017).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Richmond, supra note 17, at 1.
37 Id.
28
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such claims against insurance brokers who fail to live up to their duties.
Negligence is the most common tort claim against insurance brokers.38
To establish negligence, an insured client must establish that: (1) the broker
owed a duty to the insured client; (2) said duty was breached by the broker;
(3) the broker’s breach of duty was the proximate to the insured client’s
damages; and (4) the insured client was harmed as a result of the broker’s
breach.39 These are the typical common law elements of negligence that can
serve as a basis for a claim, regardless of a contractual relationship between
the broker and the client.40
However, in the insurance broker context, the common law claim of
negligence in tort arises from a contractual duty between the broker and the
insured client.41 To prove breach of contract, the insured client must show
that: (1) a contract, either oral or written, existed between the parties; (2) the
insurance broker materially breached the contract; and (3) the insured client
was damaged as a result of the insurance broker’s breach.42 Insurance
brokers are found negligent “[w]here an insurance agent or broker
undertakes to obtain insurance coverage for another person and fails to do
so” and “may be held liable for resulting damages to that person for breach
of contract or negligence.”43 In other words, if a broker contracts with a client
to obtain the requested insurance coverage and fails to do so, he will be found
negligent and in breach of contract.44 Negligence and breach of contract are
two separate claims; however, many claimants argue to prove these claims
overlap.
To meet the duties owed to their clients, insurance brokers must “act
with reasonable care, skill, and diligence.”45 This standard is recognized
universally, requiring the broker to “exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances,” or, as articulated by Wyoming courts, “general duty to act
reasonably towards the insured.”46 This means that “insurance agents have a
common law duty to obtain requested coverage for their clients within a
reasonable time or inform the client of the inability to do so; however, they
have no continuing duty to advise, guide or direct a client to obtain additional
coverage.”47 Whether a broker has advised a client in a reasonable amount
38

Id.
Id.
40 Wachovia Ins. Servs. v. Toomey, 994 So. 2d 980, 990 (Fla. 2008).
41 Romo v. Amedex Ins. Co., 930 So. 2d 643, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
42 Id.
43 Id. (citing Klonis v. Armstrong, 436 So. 2d 213, 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
44 Bennett v. Berk, 400 So. 2d. 484, 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
45 See e.g., Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 281 (Ct. App. 1996).
46 Bichelmeyer Meats v. Atl. Ins. Co., 42 P.3d 1191, 1196 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001); Gordon
v. Spectrum, Inc., 981 P.2d 488, 492 (Wyo. 1999).
47 Am. Bldg. Supply Corp. v. Petrocelli Group, Inc., 19 N.Y.3d 730, 735 (2012).
39

SUMBALY (DO NOT DELETE)

1/24/19 6:39 PM

200

[Vol. 43:1

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

of time is a fact-sensitive inquiry, and must be examined in light relevant
industry standards.48 If a broker is unable to secure coverage for his client,
that broker must inform the client in reasonable amount of time to allow the
insured client to seek coverage elsewhere.49 Additionally, brokers have a
duty of good faith and fair dealing that require them to secure policies that
are not “materially deficient” and to accurately represent their clients.50
Insured clients have a duty to request specific coverage and read the
policy provided to them by the insurance broker.51 Central to the common
law duties of brokers is the broker’s responsibility to procure a policy that
covers everything that the insured client has explicitly requested.52 On the
other side, the insured client must request specific coverage, since “a general
request for coverage will not satisfy the requirement of a specific request for
a certain type of coverage.”53 Without knowing the client’s specific coverage
needs, a broker will not be held liable for inadequate coverage: “a request
for ‘full coverage,’ ‘the best policy,’ or similar expressions does not place an
insurance [broker] under a duty to determine the insured’s full insurance
needs, to advise the insured about coverage, or to use his discretion and
expertise to determine what coverage the insured should purchase.”54 The
reason for specific coverage requests is rooted in the idea that:
[I]nsureds are in a better position to know their personal assets and
abilities to protect themselves more so than general insurance
agents or brokers, unless the latter are informed, asked to advise
and act . . . . Furthermore, permitting insureds to add such parties
to the liability chain might well open flood gates to even more
complicated and undesirable litigation.55
Generally, a broker’s duties to an insured client end when the broker
delivers the policy.56 Because a broker has no duty to advise an insured client
on the adequacy of his or her coverage, it is necessary for insured clients to
read and understand the policies prior to delivery.57 Thus, “the relationship
between broker and insured . . . is an ordinary commercial one.”58 “Various
48

Id.
Id.
50 Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 280 (Ct. App. 1996) (imposing
liability on agent who failed to procure level of coverage demanded by insured before insured
agreed to purchase policy).
51 Am. Bldg, 19 N.Y.3d at 736.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Trotter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 377 S.E.2d 343, 347 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988).
55 Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266, 273 (N.Y. 1997).
56 See generally Faulkner v. Gilmore, 251 Ill. App. 3d 34, 39 (1993).
57 Id. at 36.
58 Am. Bldg. Supply Corp. v. Petrocelli Group, Inc., 19 N.Y.3d 730, 737 (2012) (Pigott,
J., dissenting).
49
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appellate courts have held that once an insured has received his or her policy,
he or she is presumed to have read and understood it and cannot rely on the
broker’s word that the policy covers what is requested.”59 This reasoning
goes to the basic principle of contract law; barring any coercion,
misrepresentations, or any other violations of equitable principles, parties are
free to contract with whomever they wish, regardless of their relationship to
the other.60 Once the insured receives his or her coverage, the broker’s only
remaining duty is to give timely notice of the policy’s end date, insuring the
client avoids any gap in coverage.61 The broker is under no implied duty to
renew the policy on behalf of the client unless the broker and client agreed
to it in the contract.62
The common law duties in tort and contract law require the broker do
his job professionally.63 In the insurance broker context, some courts have
found breach of contract and negligence to be separate claims, with the duty
element for negligence arising out of the contractual agreement between
broker and client.64 Other courts recognize breach of contract and negligence
as separate claims, with the duty element for negligence arising out of an
“extra-contractual duty.”65 In either case, negligence and breach of contract
are interrelated claims; it is unlikely that any court would find a broker
negligent without also finding that the broker breached the respective
contract.66 It is unlikely that any court would find a broker negligent without
also finding the broker breached the respective contract, since the contract
between the insurance broker and the insured client is meant to procure the
specific insurance requested.67 If the broker breaches his duties, by failing to
either obtain proper insurance for the client, inform the client of inability to
obtain coverage, or by procuring the wrong type or level of coverage, the
insurance broker has both breached his contract with the insured and acted

59

Id. at 736.
Id. at 737 (Piggott, J., dissenting).
61 See generally Faulkner, 251 Ill. App. 3d 34, 38–39 (holding what duties a broker owes
a client within a Mastery Surety Agreement).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., Wachovia Ins. Servs. v. Toomey, 994 So. 2nd 980, 1000 (Fla. 2008) (Lewis,
J., dissenting in part).
65 SMI Owen Steel Co. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 520 F.3d 432, 443 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The
Nevada Supreme Court stated that insurance brokers are ‘not obligated to assume the duty of
procuring . . . insurance, but when they [do] so the law impose[s] upon them the duty of
performance in the exercise of ordinary care for the rights and interests of the [intended
purchasers].”).
66 Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Bear, LLC, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1277–
81 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (relying on its determination of the breach of contract claim when
deciding the negligence claim).
67 Id.
60
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negligently.68 If the broker successfully obtains the specific coverage, he is
in compliance compliant with his contractual obligations and the insured
party has no claim of negligence unless the parties have contracted beyond
just procuring a policy and acted with care.69 The Polar Bear case is
illustrative of this point, since the court relies on factual determinations made
in consideration of the breach of contract claim against the broker to
determine the negligence claim.70
IV. A STATE PRESCRIBED FIDUCIARY DUTY
In some states, insurance brokers owe a fiduciary duty to their insured
clients as a result of the principal/agent relationship between the parties.71
This section will focus on the California, New York and Florida approaches
in determining whether or not insurance brokers owe a fiduciary duty and
the courts’ reasoning under each approach.
A fiduciary duty, also referred to as the duty of loyalty, is central to a
principal/agent relationship. However, insurance brokers have unique
circumstances that have put the nature of the fiduciary duty, and its very
existence, into question.72 Fiduciary duties in the insurance broker context
do not always exist. Courts that recognize a fiduciary duty do so as a matter
of law, whereas courts that do not find a fiduciary duty look for a heightened
duty based on specific circumstances.73
Insurance brokers pose unique challenges for courts because of the
potential dual-agency relationship between insured and insurer, and the
policy considerations of assigning heightened duties to brokers.74 Typically,
agents have a fiduciary obligation to their principal and, “[u]nless otherwise
agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the
benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency .”75 To prove
a breach of fiduciary duty by a broker, the insured client must show: (1) a
68

Id.
Id.
70 Id. at 1278. (“As already discussed above, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Marsh
obtained the requested coverage for $17 million, and adequately informed and explained to
Bear the terms and conditions of the policy. Therefore, as a matter of law, it did not breach its
duty of reasonable care . . .”) (holding the broker not negligent but in breach of contract when
the broker and client contracted for more than just procuring policy, such as automatic
renewal, expert opinions, etc.).
71 Id. (“Under Florida law, an insurance broker has a fiduciary relationship with the
insured that requires the broker to inform and explain the coverage it has secured at the client’s
directions.”).
72 Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 1278.
73 Id. at 1281.
74 See generally Farmers Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 871 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); see
also Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266 (N.Y. 1997).
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (2010).
69
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fiduciary duty exists between the broker and the client, (2) the broker
breached his fiduciary duty, and (3) the broker’s breach of his fiduciary duty
was the proximate cause of the insured client’s harm.76 The first element,
whether a fiduciary duty exists, depends upon the relationship of the parties.
Certain relationships give rise to fiduciary duties.77 The principal/agent
relationship is a type of relationship where, as a matter of law, the agent owes
its principal a fiduciary duty.78 Courts’ methodologies in determining
whether the insurance broker’s relationship to his client is an agency
relationship is determinative of the duties owed by brokers.79 The analysis
rests on whether the court considers the insurance broker/client relationship
to be a principal/agent relationship.
California, New York, and Florida courts vary on their classification of
the insurance broker’s relationship, and duties he or she owes, to insured
clients beyond those in tort and contract. For this analysis, the following
definition of agency is important: “the relationship which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on
his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.”80
In Wachovia v. Toomey, the Florida Supreme Court, articulated that an
insurance broker owes its clients a fiduciary duty by operation of law.81 Thus,
courts in Florida recognize the agency relationship between broker and
insured client and assert that, “failing to adequately explain to [the client that
the] insurance policy,” “failing to obtain proper approval from [the client to
make changes],” and “failing to advise [the client] about the impact of the
proposed [changes]” would be a breach of the fiduciary duty.82 In the Polar
Bear case, also decided under Florida law, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of the broker because he was able to show he had fulfilled
his fiduciary duty by explaining a particular clause to the client multiple
times.83 Therefore, the duty of a broker to advise the insured as a fiduciary
agent does not suggest advising on the merits of the insurance policy; but
instead, the duty to advise requires the broker to explain the provisions in a
way that allows the client can make an informed decision on whether or not
to accept the policy.84
76

See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 1276–78.
Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd., 498 F. 3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 2007).
78 Id. (citing Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. 2002)).
79 Id.
80 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (2010).
81 Wachovia Ins. Servs. v. Toomey, 994 So. 2d 980, 984 (Fla. 2008).
82 Id.
83 Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Bear, LLC, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1280
(S.D. Cal. 2017).
84 Id. (“Ordinarily, an insurance broker has no duty to advise an insured as to the
insured’s coverage needs.”).
77
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In Tiara Condominium v. Marsh, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida recognized a duty more extensive than the
fiduciary duty of “advis[ing] and recommend[ing]” the client when a special
relationship is formed.85 This court used several factors to determine when
the duty to advise and recommend is triggered, specifically listing:
(1) representations by the broker about its expertise; (2)
representations by the broker about the breadth of coverage
obtained; (3) the length and depth of the relationship; (4) the
extent of the broker’s involvement in the client’s decision making
about its insurance needs; (5) information volunteered by the
broker about the client’s insurance needs; and (6) payment of
additional compensation for advisory services.86
A lawyer can be sued for malpractice if the lawyer does not explain the
law adequately, but he can not be found guilty if he explained the law
sufficiently to a client who ultimately made a poor determination. Similarly,
a broker will breach his fiduciary duty if he fails to explain the policies he
procures, but he will not be in breach if he explains the policies properly and
the client makes an unsatisfactory decision. Thus, Florida has imposed three
levels of duties that insurance brokers owe their insured-clients: (1) a
common law duty, (2) a fiduciary duty and, (3) a heightened duty.87
In Cathy Daniels v. Weingast, the Appellate Division of New York
stated that “in the absence of a special relationship, a claim against an
insurance broker for breach of fiduciary duty does not lie . . . Here, the
[allegations in the] complaint do not establish anything more than a typical
insurance [broker]-customer relationship.”88 The Bruckmann case further
solidifies this point, asserting “the law is reasonably settled . . . that
insurance agents have a common-law duty to obtain requested coverage for
their clients within a reasonable time or inform the client of the inability to
do so; however, they have no continuing duty to advise, guide or direct a
client to obtain additional coverage.”89 Under New York case law, there are
three factual circumstances that can give rise to a special relationship
between insurance broker and insured client:
(1) the agent receives compensation for consultation apart from

85 Id. (citing Tiara Condo. Ass’n. v. Marsh, USA Inc., 991 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1280 (S.D.
Fla. 2014)).
86 Id. at 1280–81 (citing Tiara, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1280).
87 Id. at 1280.
88 Cathy Daniels, Ltd. v Weingast, 91 A.D.3d 431, 433 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (citing
Bruckmann, Rosser, Sherrill & Co. v. Marsh USA, 65 A.D.3d 865, 867 (N.Y. App. Div.
2008); People v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 52 A.D.3d 378, 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)); See
generally Bruckmann, 65 A.D.3d at 865.
89 Bruckmann, 65 A.D.3d at 867 (quoting Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266, 270 (N.Y.
1997)).
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payment of the premiums; (2) there was some interaction
regarding a question of coverage, with the insured relying on the
expertise of the agent; or (3) there is a course of dealing over an
extended period of time which would have put objectively
reasonable insurance agents on notice that their advice was being
sought and specially relied on.90
Unlike those in Florida, New York courts do not prescribe a fiduciary
duty from an insurance broker to its insured clients as a matter of law.91
Instead, the existence of any heightened duty beyond common law tort and
contract law is a factual determination, requiring insured clients to show a
special relationship existed, establishing more extensive duties.92 New York,
therefore, only has two levels of duties: (1) a common law duty and (2) a
fiduciary duty.93
California’s rulings on this issue have been more akin to those passed
down by New York courts, with California’s courts showing a similar
hesitatation to assign heightened duties to insurance brokers. In Kotlar v.
Hartford, a California appellate court ruled that “the duty of a broker, by and
large, is to use reasonable care, diligence and judgment in procuring the
insurance requested by its client.”94 The court went on to further describe the
relationship between broker and client as “wide of the mark” when compared
to the attorney-client relationship.95 The role of lawyers to act as zealous
advocates for their clients within the bounds of the law contrasts with a
broker’s need to only use “reasonable care to represent his client.”96 In
addition, the analogy is even weaker when the dual-agency nature of an
insurance broker is taken into account, since it would not be acceptable for a
lawyer to serve as a dual-agent to both parties in a transaction.97 California’s
approach adheres strongly to the concept that a broker’s duty to its client
normally ends once the policy is procured.98
However, like in New York, California courts recognize certain factual
circumstances that could lead to duties beyond reasonable care.99 For
example, when “there is a request or inquiry by the insured for a particular
type or extent of coverage, or the [broker] assumes an additional duty by
90

266).
91

Voss v. Neth. Ins. Co., 8 N.E.3d 823, 828 (N.Y. 2014) (citing Murphy, 90 N.Y.2d at

Id.
Id.
93 Id.
94 Kotlar v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 246, 250 (Ct. App. 2000).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 250 (finding no reason to impose a duty on the broker to inform the insured that
his policy was terminating due to non-payment of premiums).
99 Kotlar, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250.
92
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either express agreement or by ‘holding himself out’ as having expertise in
a given field of insurance being sought by the insured.”100 California, like
New York, has only two levels of duties: (1) a common law duty and (2) a
heightened fiduciary duty.101
By holding the broker-client relationship to be an agency relationship,
and thereby imposing an inherent fiduciary duty as a matter of law, Florida
courts have made policy considerations in favor of policyholders.102 Florida
courts go even further, however, establishing a duty beyond fiduciary that
allows the insured client to demonstrate there is a special relationship
between broker and client requiring brokers to advise and recommend.103 On
the other hand, California and New York courts have not imposed this
inherent fiduciary duty and require a fact-sensitive inquiry considering
whether a special relationship exists, thereby taking a “pro-insurance broker”
stance.104
V. COMPARING CALIFORNIA, NEW YORK AND FLORIDA STANDARDS FOR
FORMING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP OR FIDUCIARY DUTY
Courts have an extremely difficult task in determining how high to set
the bar for establishing a special relationship and holding brokers to
heightened duties. This section will compare the thresholds set by each court,
the policy considerations involved, and their relative strengths and
weaknesses. As noted, courts in California, New York, and Florida all
recognize certain factual circumstances that create duties beyond those
proscribed in common law.
California only considers an insurance broker to have breached his duty
of care in obtaining an insurance policy for the insured in three instances:
where (1) the broker misrepresented the nature, extent, or scope of the
coverage that is being either offered or provided; (2) the insured client has
asked for a “particular type or extent of coverage; or (3) the broker has taken
on an additional duty either by express agreement or by presenting himself
as an expert in the specific area of insurance being requested.105 Although
the court in Pacific Rim distinctly considered the factors separately, they can
be examined interdependently.106 If a prospective insured client asks a broker
for “a particular type or extent of coverage,” it is likely because “the broker
100 Pac. Rim Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Ins. Servs. West, Inc., 138 Cal. Rptr.
3d 294, 297–98 (Ct. App. 2012), (citing Fitzpatrick v. Hayes, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 452 (Ct.
App. 1997)).
101 Id. at 298.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 298–300.
104 See generally id.
105 Id. at 297–99.
106 Pac. Rim., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 297-99.
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is holding himself out” as an expert in the related field.107 Where the broker
is not “holding himself out” as an expert and a prospective client assumes
the broker to be an expert without specifically inquiring, the client is taking
a gamble.108 Objectors to this interpretation argue that a broker may “hold
himself out,” to be an expert, where in reality he is not.109 However, this
scenario is hard to imagine without an express statement, oral or written, of
expertise. If the broker misleads the insured about his expertise, he assumes
the additional duty and the court will find him liable for any breach of this
duty.110 This is to say that none of the factors test dispositive; with courts
instead considering the totality of circumstances.
The contract theory of reliance is embedded in this test.111 The insured
client must show he relied on the broker when he signed the insurance policy,
and he had valid reason to rely on the broker. The test is only used to show
a heightened duty exists; whether the broker breached this duty is an entirely
separate question. Thus, finding an insurance broker in breach of his
heightened fiduciary duty is an uphill battle for the insured client in
California.
New York courts’ prior decisions pose similar difficulties for insured
clients. New York courts considers three circumstances that create a special
fiduciary relationship between insurance broker and insured client.112 The
first situation occurs when the broker was paid an additional amount on top
of the premium he or she received for their consultation.113 The analysis of
this factor requires an understanding between the broker and insured client
that the broker is going beyond his ordinary duties and thus should be
compensated accordingly.114
The second instance occurs when there has been an interaction between
the broker and client in which the client inquired about coverage and relied
on the broker’s expertise.115 The second occurrence is not met when the
insured simply shows that he or she asked a question and relied on the
107

Id. at 297.
Id.
109 Id.
110
Id. at 297–203; see also Century Sur. Co. v. Crosby Ins., Inc., 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 115,
119 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that an insurance broker is not immune from fraud, regardless
of other duties and the respective claims that arise from them. “The following elements must
be pleaded to state a cause of action for fraud: (1) a misrepresentation of a material fact; (2)
knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to deceive and induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance on the
misrepresentation; and (5) resulting damages.”).
111 Pac. Rim., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 297–203.
112 Voss v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 8 N.E.3d 823, 828 (N.Y. 2014) (citing Murphy v. Kuhn,
90 N.Y.2d 266, 272–93 (N.Y. 1997).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 829.
115 Id.
108
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answer.116 The broker’s manner and substance of his response are also
relevant to this inquiry, with the court asserting that “the casual response,
given informally, [will] not elevate an ordinary commercial relationship to
one that would impose a duty to determine value and ensure full
coverage.”117 This means that the broker must offer expert advice to the
insured client, and the insured client must rely on said expert advice.118 If the
insured does not heed the alleged expert advice, no fiduciary duty will be
imposed.119
The third occurrence considers whether a reasonable broker in the
normal course of dealing would know that the insured client is relying on his
advice.120 This third instance alone has several considerations; it must show:
(1) a course of dealing, (2) over a long period of time, (3) events that would
put the broker on notice that the insured client views him as an expert, (4)
either through an express agreement or reliance on the broker’s expertise,
and (5) that the insured client relief on the broker’s expertise in signing the
policy.121 If an insured client is relying on the third instance to impose a
fiduciary duty on the broker, proving a course of dealing over an extended
period of time will be the simplest element to prove.122 However, the
reasonableness standard implicit in the third situation is more difficult to
establish. The standard requires the insured client to demonstrate multiple
occasions in which he or she requested expert advice from the broker, and
multiple times where the client relied enough on this advice, giving notice to
the broker that the insured client is relying on the broker’s expertise.123 All
three circumstances have difficult burdens for the insured client to meet; in
the words of the Voss court, “special relationships in the insurance brokerage
context are the exception, not the norm.”124
Though Florida courts have employed a fact-sensitive special
relationship standard, it is nonetheless different from New York and
California’s standards, emphasizing a pro-policyholder, anti-insurance
broker stance.125 For example, Florida has six factors, many of which are not
considered by California or New York courts.126 This makes it easier to
establish a heightened duty. There are common factors, as well; however,
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id.
W. Joseph McPhillips, Inc. v. Ellis, 8 A.D.3d 782, 784 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Voss, 8 N.E.3d at 829–30 (citing Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266 (N.Y. 1997)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 830.
Id.
Voss, 8 N.E.3d at 829–30.
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Florida recognizes the broker-client relationship as inherently that of
principal-agent with a fiduciary duty to explain the procured policies.127
Florida courts use the three factors in their analyses that are used by
California and New York courts, as well as an additional three factors:
(1) representations by the broker about its expertise; (2)
representations by the broker about the breadth of coverage
obtained; (3) the length and depth of the relationship; (4) the
extent of the broker’s involvement in the client’s decision making
about its insurance needs; (5) information volunteered by the
broker about the client’s insurance needs; and (6) payment of
additional compensation for advisory services.128
California’s three factors are (1) whether the broker misrepresented the
nature, extent, or scope of the coverage; (2) whether the client asked for a
particular type or extent of coverage; and (3) whether the broker has
expressly or impliedly taken on a heightened duty.129 New York’s threefactor test considers whether the client has paid the broker an additional sum
to the premium, whether the client requested the broker’s expertise, and
whether the broker had reason to know that the client had relied on his
expertise as a result of the length and breadth of his relationship with the
client.130 Accordingly, Florida’s additional factors consider the brokers’
involvement in the client’s decision-making, the information volunteered by
the broker, and the representations by the broker about the breadth of
coverage obtained.131 These additional factors allow the insured clients to
bring claims against insurance brokers in a wider set of circumstances.
VI. ANALYSIS
Florida’s three additional factors deviate from the deep-seeded policy
position that the insured is in the best position to evaluate risk for his
business. There are two main policy considerations that have prompted
courts and state legislators to impose a high threshold on finding that
insurance brokers owe a heightened duty to their clients.132 First, “[i]mposing
on intermediaries a general duty to advise insured about the adequacy and
appropriateness of coverage insulates insureds from the burden of evaluating
and caring for their own financial needs.”133 Second, creating a general duty
127

Id.
Tiara Condo. Ass’n v. Marsh, USA, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
129 Pac. Rim Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Ins. Servs. West, Inc, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d
294, 297–98 (Ct. App. 2012).
130 Voss, 8 N.E.3d at 829–30.
131 Tiara, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1281.
132 ROBERT H JERRY & DOUGLAS R RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 225
(5th ed. 2012).
133 Id.
128
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to advise allows insured parties to fill gaps in their policy after an uncovered
loss has occurred and blame the broker for the lack of coverage.134 Placing
such a duty on brokers “turns the entire theory of insurance on its ear as
individuals, in theory, take an ‘intellectual gamble’ when purchasing
insurance as they weigh the expense of insurance versus the amount of
coverage that they purchase. Allowing insureds to seek coverage, postoccurrence, allows them to completely circumvent this risk.”135
In this section, the note will evaluate California’s, New York’s, and
Florida’s standards against the backdrop of these overarching policy
considerations. Specifically, it will argue in favor of California’s standards
for brokers over both Florida and New York.
California’s test, which only finds a heightened duty if the broker
misleads, the insured makes a specific request for a particular extent of
coverage, or if broker has expressly or impliedly held himself out to be an
expert, should be adopted by every state’s judiciary. These requirements are
consistent with the policy objectives because it keeps the task of risk
assessment with the insured unless the broker agrees to serve as risk expert
and advise the insured client.136 In this way, the broker is taking on a separate
role not just as a broker, but also as a risk advisor.137
Though California courts, under the right circumstances, have held
brokers to have taken on this additional advisory role, they have only done
so in very specific cases.138 For example, in Greenfield v. Insurance Inc., the
California Court of Appeals found that when the insured client asked his
broker for an “all-risk business interruption policy,” he or she made a
specific request for particular coverage.139 However, the broker procured a
policy that did not cover mechanical defects.140 Thus, the court held that the
broker was liable based on negligence.141 In contrast, in Fitzpatrick v. Hayes,
the insured asked whether the procured policy adequately covered his
automobile.142 There, the court held that a general inquiry to the adequacy of
the policy did not rise to the level of a specific request for particular
coverage.143 Thus, the broker was not liable for the insured’s uncovered

134

Id.
Farmers Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 871 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
136 David Martin, Christopher Hossellman & Seymour Everett, Broker, Advisor, or Both?
When an Expanded Duty Will Be Imposed, 57 ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER 22 (2015).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 24.
139 Greenfield v. Ins., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167 (Ct. App. 1971).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 168.
142 Fitzpatrick v. Hayes, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 447(Ct. App. 1997).
143 Id. at 453.
135
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losses.144 These two cases highlight the high threshold California has for
insureds to prove they made a specific request for particular coverage.
California’s inquiry into whether the broker has expressly agreed to
take on a risk advisory role or held himself out to be an expert, has focused
on the latter.145 There is no sound argument against holding a broker liable
if he has expressly agreed to be a risk advisor to the insured’s detriment.146
However, when the broker has not expressly taken on this role, California
courts have only found a broker to have “held himself out” to be an expert
in very specific circumstances.147 For example, in Williams v. Hilb, when an
insured party requested a meeting to discuss the type of coverage he needed
for his business, the broker responded “[I am] the go-to person to take care
of the insurance needs for Rhino Linings dealerships,” and “[I am] the expert
on the product necessary to satisfy [Rhino SFS’s] insurance needs.”148 Here,
the court ruled that the broker had assumed the advisory role as an expert to
the insured’s detriment and was therefore liable.149 On the other hand,
California courts have not held “conclusory allegations regarding alleged
expertise are insufficient” to impose a heightened duty on the broker.150
Specifically, the court held “[t]he mere allegation in a complaint, as in this
case, that an insured has purchased insurance from an insurance [broker] for
several years and followed his advice on certain insurance matters is
insufficient to imply the existence of a greater duty.”151 The court in Jones
rejected the idea that the length of the insured’s professional relationship
with the broker was a relevant or decisive factor in finding a heightened
duty.152 In this case, the broker had general financial information regarding
the insured’s business, but the court held that the broker could not have
reasonably known how much the insured was willing to pay for the premium
or whether the financial information the broker had was the full extent of the
insured’s assets.153 In concluding that the broker was not liable here, the court
heavily relied on the abovementioned policy considerations.154 Similarly, in
Wallman v. Suddock, the court found that mere allegations, or the subjective
belief of the insured, that the broker held himself out to be an expert, were
144

Id. at 454.
Martin et al., supra note 136.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Williams v. Hilb, Rogal & Hobbs Ins. Servs. of Cal., Inc., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 910, 913
(Ct. App. 2009).
149 Id. at 923.
150 Martin et al., supra note 136 at 24.
151 Jones v. Grewe, 234 Cal. Rptr. 717, 721 (Ct. App. 1987).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 721–22.
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insufficient to find a heightened duty.155 Without an express agreement,
California courts have been hesitant and strict in assigning a heightened duty
for insurance brokers because the insured is in the best position to assess his
risks and request the appropriate coverage.
New York courts have taken a similar approach to California, except
for the fact that they have an additional factor. New York’s first and second
factors are identical to California’s first two factors.156 New York’s factor
regarding an additional payment on top of the premium made to the broker
is akin to California’s requirement of an express agreement to be an expert
advisor. New York’s second factor which focuses on the insured asking a
specific question and the broker in response providing expert advice is akin
to California’s “holding himself out as an expert” factor.157
New York courts, however, also consider the course of dealing and
length of relationship to hold the broker to a heightened duty.158 It is
important to note that New York has never found a broker liable under a
heightened duty.159 New York courts thus far have only acknowledged that
this circumstance has been considered by other jurisdictions and has merit.160
New York courts rely on Trotter v. State Farm, wherein the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that doing business with the same company for eight
years was insufficient to establish a heighted duty, barring any evidence that
showed the broker should have known about the reliance.161 The insured’s
reliance alone is not enough; the broker should be aware of the fact that the
insured is relying on his expertise.162 Even though New York courts have
recognized this avenue to hold the broker to a greater duty, the fact that the
court has never found a heightened duty in this situation demonstrates the
court’s reluctance to impose it.163 Regardless, New York courts should no
longer recognize this third circumstance and adhere to the two analyses in
common with that of California. The California approach is the most
appropriate because as the New York Court of Appeals has upheld,
“[i]nsurance agents or brokers are not personal financial counselors and risk
managers, approaching guarantor status,” unless they have assumed such
155

Wallman v. Suddock, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 566, 585 (Ct. App. 2011).
Compare Voss v. Neth. Ins. Co., 8 N.E.3d 823, 828 (N.Y. 2014), with Pac. Rim Mech.
Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Ins. Servs. West, Inc., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294, 297–98 (Ct. App.
2012).
157 Compare Voss, 8 N.E.3d at 828, with Pac. Rim, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 297–-98.
158 See e.g., Voss, 8 N.E.3d at 828.
159 Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266, 269–71 (1997).
160 Id. at 975 (citing Trotter V. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 377 S.E.2d 343 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1988)).
161 Trotter, 377 S.E.2d at 343.
162 Id.
163 See e.g., 5 Awnings Plus, Inc. v. Moses Ins. Grp., Inc., 108 A.D.3d 1198 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013); Murphy, 90 N.Y.2d at 273.
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responsibility expressly.164
The three additional factors in Florida shift the risk assessment from
the insured to the broker in more circumstances than is appropriate, which is
contrary to the overarching policy objectives regarding the role and duty of
insurance brokers. It is important to note that in Florida, finding a special
relationship is a question of fact for the jury to decide.165 Thus, factors that
the jury can consider should be limited. Florida’s additional factors, when
considered by a jury, allow the insured the opportunity to escape his
responsibility of risk and opens the door for claims against brokers that are
unjustified.
First, as an independent factor, the extent of the broker’s involvement
in the client’s decision-making puts the broker between a rock and a hard
place. Indeed, brokers should not be so clinical so that the insured simply
asks for coverage and the broker procures it. Brokers should be build
relationships with their insured clients, which naturally involves the broker
in the client’s decision-making. However, without the broker’s express
acquiescence to serve in an expert or advisory role, the client should be fully
aware that he is in the best position to assess his own needs and make the
final decision on the type of coverage he prefers. If the broker misrepresents
or does not procure the coverage requested, he will be found liable under
common law.166
Second, the broker’s representations regarding the breadth of coverage
should be more than casual remarks. Again, this factor is considered by a
jury. Casual remarks such as “this policy is good” or “that is the best policy
we could find,” could be taken as an expert opinion when in fact, they are
not. Again, the client should know whether the policy is adequate to cover
his risks. If the broker provides extremely specific and expert-like opinions
on the breadth of coverage, the insured should inquire whether this is
intended to be expert advice. In general, a client seeking insurance should be
clear about the type of coverage he needs in addition to the type of
relationship he has with the broker.
Finally, information volunteered by the broker assumes the broker is an
expert. If a broker volunteers information, the insured client may probe and
inquire further, which may trigger a heightened duty. Volunteering
information, without any follow up or further questioning by the insured,
does not put the broker on notice that the client is relying on him as an expert,
and allows the insured to substitute his own judgment and responsibility.
Ultimately, the three additional factors used by Florida courts are broad

164
165
166

Murphy, 90 N.Y.2d at 273.
Tiara Condo. Ass’n v. Marsh, USA, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1282 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
Id. at 1280.
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and unqualified. Florida’s approach provides the jury with broad discretion
to find brokers liable, and causes the jury to assume the risk assessment role
involuntarily. California and New York courts have fewer and more specific
factors, which strictly adhere to leaving the financial and risk decision
making with the insured, which is where it belongs.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is apparent through recent case law across the country that
California’s approach is the emerging trend.167 For example, Louisiana, a
state that is traditionally hostile towards applying a narrow broker duty,
recently held that an insurance broker owes no fiduciary duty to his clients.168
Assigning broad duties to insurance brokers opens the floodgates for
insureds to sue their brokers after a loss has occurred.169 Essentially, broad
duties allow insureds to scapegoat their failures in assessing their own risks
at the time they request coverage, either because they are not business-savvy
or are trying to avoid paying high premiums for unlikely risks. When these
risks manifest, assigning blame to a broker should not be an easy fix or a goto alternative for requesting adequate insurance to begin with. Insureds are
in the best position to assess their risks and request the appropriate coverage.
Therefore, the national trend should continue towards the Californian
approach, with courts across the nation rejecting Florida’s overly broad
factors.
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Martin et al., supra note 139 at 24.
Isidore Newman Sch. v. J. Everett Eaves, Inc., 42 So. 3d 352; (La. 2013); see also
Barreca v. Weiser, 53 So. 3d 481 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
169 Isidore Newman Sch., 42 So. 3d at 357–58.
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